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SHARES WITH NO PAR VALUE
By RAYMOND F. RiCe* AND ALBERT J. HARNOj
W ITH the growth of modern business corporations many
of the attributes, which had once been considered inherent
to the corporate idea, have broken down in practice. But un-
mindful of this fact legislatures have industriously passed laws
the object of which has been to restrict the corporation within
the confines of former approved notions. Witness the various
laws directed at the "watered stock" evil. An abundance of liti-
gation has resulted. The chief difficulty has arisen over the at-
tempt to 'make par value of stock correspond to the actual
value of the assets of the corporation.
The relation existing between a corporation and its members
was once believed to be that of trustee and cestuis que trust.,
The custom of dividing the joint stock of the corporation into
shares made its appearance in connection with ventures of the
early English trading companies. 2  A par value was subse-
quently given to each share to indicate that an amount equal to
that represented on the face of the shares had been contributed
to the venture.3 That the par value idea should so quietly
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
tProfessor of Law, University of Kansas.
"'The legal interest of all the stock is in the Company, who are the
trustees for the several members." Child v. Hudson's Bay Company (1723)
2 P. Wms. 207.
2"The idea of a share of stock as Americans hold it has been artifi-
cially deduced from the dominant theory of joint venture which underlay
the English Trading incorporations of the sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries." Address by Shepard, Corporate Capitalization and
Public Morals, (1907) Illinois Bar Association Reports, Part II, 29, 44.
For a history of these companies see 2 Davis, Corporations Their
Origin and Development, 114.3See Shares Without Par Value, (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 278.
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creep in, then promptly to be accepted as a corporate incident,
and almost immediately become the subject of heated contention
is enigmatical.
4
The par value standard once having been accepted in the law
of corporations, certain far-reaching consequences developed. It
was held that a creditor in dealing with a corporation could
assume that the corporation had actually received assets equal
to the par value of the shares issued. Consequently if the share-
holders on the original issue had paid for their shares in money
or property which did not equal in value the par value of the
shares, and bona fide claims of creditors had accrued subsequent
to the issue, which claims on the liquidation of the corporation
remained unsatisfied, these original shareholders could be com-
pelled to pay the difference between the actual value of the assets
received by the corporation and the face value of the shares.5
The strictness of the rule being only varied in degree depending
on whether the "good faith rule" or the "actual value rule" had
been adopted in the jurisdiction where the question arose.
A competent authority has said that this custom of so fixing
the capital of a corporation "has not worked well in practice, ex-
cept as applied to corporations, like banking corporations, whose
business is to deal in money, credits and securities, and whose
assets are kept in liquid form." 6 That the practice is arbi-
trary there can be little doubt. The par value of shares even at
the inception of a corporation rarely equals the assets of the
corporation. Yet as against the claims of creditors it is no de-
fense that the shares were not worth more on the market than
the amount paid for them. The numerous laws passed seeking
to sustain this artificial standard by imposing penalties for stock
watering have resulted in prolific litigation but in no solution
of the problem.
Moreover, the reason given for the rule, that the par value
of shares serves as an indication of the amount of capital in the
corporation on which creditors can and do rely, is inadequate.
It is believed, as a matter of fact that little, if any, reliance is
placed by a creditor on the nominal capital of a corporation.7
4See article by Dwight, Par Value of Stock, (1907) 16 Yale L. J. 247.5Scovill v. Thayer, (1881) 105 U. S. 143, 26 L. Ed. 968.6Morawetz, Shares Without Nominal or Par Value, (1913) 26 Harv.
L. Rev. 729.
7"The creditor who is sane considers not the nominal, but the actual
situation; his concern is with the company's realizable property, its mort-
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Further, even if the full par value of shares has been paid, this
rarely remains for long any safe test of the amount of actual
capital. As it recently has been said:
"Even in cases, however, where stock with par value is
fully paid in cash or in property taken at its actual value, practi-
cal experience has shown that it is quite impossible to maintain
a constant equilibrium between the nominal capitalization of a
corporation and its assets. A fortiori, when such intangible and
problematical assets as good will and expectancies are capital-
ized, a share can represent only an aliquot part of the total
assets whatever its par value may be. The nominal face value
then is always a fiction and one which the courts themselves
disregard when recognition of it would be inequitable.""
,All the--exigencies of -business would tend to vary the capital
rather than to stabilize it. Business losses frequently occur which
depreciate the capital, or the corporation may have its capital
invested in property such as mines, oil wells and the like which
are ever depreciating in value. It is a safe assumption that the
nominal capital is seldom a true indication of the actual assets
of a corporation and that often it is utterly unreliable as such.
Another example of the impracticability of the par value
standard occurs when a going concern finds itself in difficulties
and undertakes to increase its capital by a new issue of stock
or a bond issue with a stock bonus. Some courts have held in
such cases that the corporation may issue shares at their market
value irrespective of this par value, or may issue bonus stock
in aid of the sale of bonds. Policy is given as a reason for
this deviation from the rule., But if the nominal capital can ever
be relied on by a creditor, there surely is no good reason why
it would not be as misleading in this case as where the shares
were sold for less than par on the first issue.10
On facts similar to those just instanced other courts have
applied the strict rule holding that it is just as much of a fraud
on creditors to sell at less than par to increase the capital of a
going concern as on the original issue."' These courts are logi-
gage or lien debts, its floating debts, its gross income, its net income."
Shepard, Corporate Capitalization and Public Morals, (1907) Illinois Bar
Association Reports, Part II, 29, 50.
sShares Without Par Value, (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 278.9H-andley v. Stutz, (1891) 139 U. S. 417, 35 L. Ed. 227, 11 S. C. R.
530.
'o"For if the creditors have any right, there would seem to be no
basis for any distinction between the original issue and any subsequent
issue." Wickersham, The Capital of a Corporation, (1906) 22 Harv.
L. Rev. 319, 331.
"'See Jackson v. Traer, (1884) 64 Iowa 469, 20 N. W. 764, 45 Am.
Rep. 449.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cal but the rule is impolitic. Where the capital of a corporation
is impaired its stock, as a rule, is selling on the market at less
than par. No one will pay more for shares than their market
value. The anomaly is apparent.12
The practice of dividing the joint stock of a corporation into
shares and of assigning to each share a definite value has been
so generally accepted by our legislatures and courts as sound
in theory and practical in operation that it is difficult to appre-
ciate the fact that the share idea is of comparatively recent de-
velopment. In the list of attributes of a corporation, some ten
in number, laid down by Lord Coke in the Case of Sutton's Hos-
pital, no reference is made to shares of stock, 3 nor does Black-
stone, writing more than a hundred and fifty years later, make
mention of the share idea in his enumeration of the incidents of
a corporation. Even in this country, the earlier state and colo-
nial charters prescribed no capital or share value, but with the
unparalleled expansion of corporate activities and development
of the law of corporations which characterized the nineteenth
century, the par value theory speedily received universal accept-
ance as an essential feature of the recognized scheme of corpo-
rate organization and financing. In many jurisdictions definite
limits were specified for the fixing of such par value, some stat-
utes making provision for a minimum value only, varying from
one to twenty-five dollars, and others fixing a certain maximum
par value, which was usually placed at one hundred dollars. A
few states undertook to prescribe both maximum and minimum
limits, while others, although requirfng some par value to be an-
nexed to certificates of stock, assumed the more liberal attitude
of permitting such value to be fixed by the articles of incorpora-
tion. In some states authority was given for the issuance of
shares of stock "of any par value," but such provisions were uni-
formly construed as merely delegating to the incorporators the
12"To say that a corporation may not, under the circumstances above
indicated, put its stock upon the market and sell it to the highest bidder,
is practically to declare that a corporation can never increase its capital
by a sale of shares if the original stock has fallen below par." H-andley
v. Stutz, (1891) 139 UI. S. 417, 430, 35 L. Ed. 227, 11 S. C. R. 530.
But see Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, (1908) 631, where he
says: "The proper course to pursue in such a case would be, first, to
reduce the nominal capital until it corresponds with the actual capital as
diminished by losses, and then the old shares will be worth par, and the
new shares may likewise be issued at par." This solution, would, no doubt,
frequently be found difficult if not impracticable.
13(1612) 10 Co. Rep. 1.
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authority to value the stock proposed to be issued, and that the
way was thus opened for the formation of corporations with un-
valued shares was not even suggested. Even in those jurisdic-
tions whose statutes were wholly silent so far as the par value
of shares was concerned, it was apparently taken for granted
that some value must be assigned to each share and that a cer-
tificate without the dollar mark was as incomplete as one which
failed to specify the number of shares represented by it. De-
spite the fact that there were modern precedents for the issu-
ance of participation certificates of indeterminate value, both in
foreign jurisdictions and in this country as well,'1 4 it was not
until the closing years of the last century that the logic and ex-
pediency of the annexation of a nominal value to certificates of
stock was seriously challenged.
Whatever may be the ultimate conclusion as to the soundness
of the theory and its practicability in operation, it must be con-
ceded that the introduction of non par value stock represents a
departure from the hitherto accepted scheme of corporate cap-
italization of so sweeping and revolutionary a character that
its effect upon the future trend and development of the law of
corporations cannot but be tremendously far reaching. Al-
ready no less than eighteen states have sanctioned the formation
of domestic corporations having shares of stock without nom-
inal or par value,15 and of the remaining states the vast major-
ity, either as a result of judicial decisions or without such com-
pulsion, admit without question corporations organized on this
basis under the laws of other commonwealths.
'4White, Corporations, 8th Ed., p. 371:--"For several years this
method of issuing shares of stock has been in practical use by one of the
voluntary joint stock associations organized in the State of New York.
In 1907 another practical example of the working of the plan was given
in the 'ore certificates' issued by the trustees of the Great Northern Iron
Ore properties, which are now listed and dealt in on the New York Stock
Exchange."
'sThe following is submitted as a fairly complete and accurate list
of the non par value stock acts:
New York-Laws 1912, c. 351; Laws 1917, cc. 484, 500, 501; Laws
1920, cc. 606, 608; Maryland-Laws 1916, c. 596; Delaware-Laws 1917,
c. 113; California-Laws 1917, c. 701; Maine-Laws 1917, c. 144; Virginia
-Acts 1918, c. 353, superseded by Acts 1919, c. 48; Alabama-Genl.
Acts 1919, No. 458; Illinois-Laws 1919, pp. 312, 323; New Hampshire-
Laws 1919, c. 92; Pennsylvania-Laws 1919, No. 363; Wisconsin-Laws,
1919, c. 681; Ohio-Laws 1919, p. 1287, Vol. 108, Part 2; Massachusetts-
Acts and Resolves, 1920, c. 349; New Jersey-Laws 1920, c. 168; Rhode
Island-Public Laws 1919-1920, c. 1925; West Virginia-Acts 1920, c. 3;
Kansas-Laws 1921, c. 150; Missouri-Laws 1921 p. 664, sec. 9.
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The investigator cannot but be impressed with the strength
and vitality of a movement which, finding its first legislative
sanction in 1912, has, in less than a decade, without organized
support or concerted effort, spread from coast to coast and made
possible the entrance of non par value stock corporations, either
as domestic or foreign organizations, into all of our states, with
the exception of a scant half-dozen, and into the Dominion of
Canada as well.16 It must not be supposed, however, that the
legislative action has been hasty or ill-advised, for not less than
twenty years of agitation and discussion preceded the enactment
of the initial statute, and in the first five years following its
passage but four states were added to the list.
In 1892 a special committee of the New York State Bar
Association, in a report to that body on various matters pertain-
ing to the law of corporations, included a recommendation that
provision be made for the organization of a "distinct class of
corporations, whose capital stock may be issued as representing
proportional parts of the whole capital, withdut any nominal or
money value."'1 7 While this recommendation was adopted by the
association, no immediate effort appears to have been made to
translate it into legislation and for the next fifteen years we
find only scattered and occasional references to the subject, for
the most part by members of the committee of 1892 and by other
members of the Bar Association whose interest appears to have
been challenged through the medium of the report above re-
ferred to. Mr. Francis Lynde Stetson, one of the members of
the original committee, in testifying before the United States In-
dustrial Commission, in 1899, directed the attention of that body
to the theory that certificates of stock should purport to repre-
sent merely proportionate interests in the assets of the corpora-
tion, and should not attempt to indicate any monetary value,
Another member of the New York Bar who became an early
advocate of non par value stock was Mr. Edward M. Shepard.
His address at the October, 1906, session of the Bar Associa-
tion of New Hampshire constitutes a most valuable contribu-
tion to the literature on the subject, 9 and in the annual address
I6 Statutes of Canada, 1917, 7 and 8 Geo. V, an act to amend theCompanies Act (assented to Sept. 20, 1917).3.Proceedings of New York State Bar Association, January 1892, 138.18Proceedings of Congressional Industrial Commission (1899) Vol. 1,
976.
'
9 Publications of the Bar Association of New Hampshire, N. S. Vol.2, 273-297; also published in (1906) 18 Green Bag 601 et seq.
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shares of stock without nominal or par value.26 This bill, with
the sanction of the Association, was introduced in the Legisla-
ture of 1912, and formed the basis of the initial non-par value
stock act, which went into effect on April 15, 1912.27 While sub-
sequently amended in some particulars, 28 all of the essential pro-
visions of the act remain unchanged, and, although many of the
subsequent statutes are much less elaborate and detailed in their
provisions, the influence which the New York act has exerted
upon the trend of later legislation is plainly apparent from even
the most cursory examination and comparison of the statutes.
While a comparative study of the various acts is not within the
scope of the present article, it may be of interest to note, in
passing, a few of their most striking features of similarity and
dissimilarity.
It is worthy of note, at the outset, that the provisions of the
several acts are permissive rather than mandatory. While some
of the more ardent advocates of non par value stock would re-
quire the immediate removal of the dollar mark from all cer-
tificates of stock, with the possible exception of those issued by
banks and other moneyed corporations, the consensus of opinion
appears to be that, at the present time, such extreme action would
be inexpedient. At the 1911 meeting of the New York State Bar
Association, Mr. Elihu Root, then president of that body, in re-
sponse to the inquiry whether he would make it mandatory upon
corporations to refrain from valuing their stock, said:
"I think that is a matter purely of expediency. It may be,
the wisest course at first is to make it permissive and thus avoid
the difficulty of forcing people to conduct their business in a
way which many of them may not approve in the first instance.
I am confident that . . . if, under a permissive provision,
it once gets into operation, that you will soon see an end by
voluntary action of this representation by corporations as to the
value of their assets.' 28
Mr. Arthur W. Machen, in his letter transmitting to the Com-
mittee on Uniform Incorporation Act of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Seventh Ten-
2GReports of New York State Bar Association, 1912, Vol. 35, 132, 148.
27Laws 1912, c. 351.
28Laws 1917, cc. 484, 500, 501; Laws 1920, cc. 606, 608.
For a more complete statement relating to the endeavors to inaugurate
no par value legislation previous to the passage of the initial law in New
York, see article, Corporations With Shares Having No Par Value (1921)
3 Illinois Law Bulletin, 71.29Reports of New York State Bar Association, 1911, Vol. 34, 78.
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before the Illinois State Bar Association in 1907, he further
amplified the idea of the substitution of non par value stock for
shares having a money denomination. 20
In 1908 the New York State Bar Association again gave its
approval to the principle of unvalued stock and manifested its
renewed interest in the proposition by the appointment of a Spe-
cial Committee on Corporation Law2' for the preparation and
presentation to the Legislature of "amendments to the corpora-
tion laws permitting the formation of corporations having cap-
ital stock divided into shares without assignment thereto of any
value in money.122 The resultant bill, with the recommendation
of the Bar Association,23 was introduced in the Legislature in
1909, and passed both houses, but was disapproved by the gov-
ernor on account of certain objections suggested by the state
comptroller in connection with the imposition and collection of
the stock transfer taxes and annual franchise assessments pro-
vided for in the existing corporation laws. It is of interest to
note, in this connection, that Governor Hughes offered no objec-
tion to the principle embodied in the bill, but stated, in his mem-
orandum of disapproval that "it had received the approval of
public spirited students of corporate problems." In 1910, the
bill, with amendments drafted to meet the objections of the state
comptroller, was again introduced in the Legislature and was
passed by the Assembly, but failed in the Senate through the op-
position of a single member, who felt constrained to withhold
his support for no other reason than that of the novelty of the
proposition.2 4 Again in 1911, after having for the third time re-
ceived the stamp of approval of the State Bar Association, the
bill was introduced in the Legislature, but failed to reach a vote
in the Assembly after having been passed by the Senate.25  Un-
dismayed by these repeated failures, the Committee on Corpora-
tion Law presented at the 1912 meeting of the Bar Association
its fourth draft of a bill to amend the stock corporation law by
making provision for the organization of corporations having
20Reports of Illinois Bar Association, 1907, Part II, 29-60.
2lThis Committee included Francis Lynde Stetson, Chairman, Edward
M. Shepard and Victor Morawetz, and was continued without change in
personnel until 1911, when, upon the death of Mr. Shepard, he was suc-
ceeded by Louis Marshall.22Reports of New York State Bar Association, 1908, Vol. 31, 43-45.23Reports of New York State Bar Association, 1909, Vol. 32, 270-280.24Reports of New York State Bar Association, 1910, Vol. 33, 515, 517.25Reports of New York State Bar Association, 1911, Vol. 34, 54, 80.
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tative Draft of a Uniform Incorporation Act, expresses substan-
tially the same opinion, adding the suggestion that some restric-
tive measures be taken to discourage the issuance of par value
stock. He says:
"The present draft also provides for stock without nominal
or par value. I wish it were feasible to require all stock to be
issued without par value. To do so would emphasize actualities
rather than fictions, but unfortunately would be at the present
time too great a departure from the business practice. I would,
however, encourage the issue of stock without par value by lay-
ing some discriminatory tax on any corporation whose stock has
a par value."30
While the statutes thus far disclose no disposition to force the
adoption of unvalued stock, there is no such uniformity of their
provisions specifying the classes of corporations which may be
organized with such stock. The tendency of the more recent
acts appears to be in the direction of permitting the issuance of
such stock by all corporations, except banks, trust companies and
other moneyed corporations. This limitation is to be found in the
New York Act of 1912 and is apparently based on sound con-
siderations of public policy, but there appear in the above act and
in not a few of the statutes modeled thereafter other limitations
which seem to restrict unnecessarily the application of the doc-
trine. Such a restriction is that excepting from the operation of
the act corporations under the jurisdiction of the public service
or public utilities commissions of the respective states. This ex-
ception, it should be noted, was not embodied in the drafts of
bills prepared by the Committee of the New York State Bar
Association and recommended by that body for adoption, but was
engrafted upon the bill after its introduction in the Legislature.
The wisdom of this limitation may well be doubted in view of
the frequency with which competent and disinterested author-
ities have given expression to the opinion that non par value
stock is particularly adapted to the exigencies of public service
corporations. The Public Service Commission for the Second
District of the State of New York, in an opinion delivered
through its chairman, F. W. Stevens, on July 21, 1908, in the
Matter of the Application of The New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad Company for leave to acquire certain stocks, dis-
cussed at considerable length the advantages of non par value
3OReport of the Committee on a Uniform Incorporation Act to the
Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, held in August, 1920, p. 7.
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stock, with particular reference to public utilities. The follow-
ing is a brief excerpt from the opinion:
"The harmfulness of excessive issues of capital stock of cor-
porations serving the public arises from the fact that stock of a
given face value has not behind it property equal in actual value
to the face value of the stock. The result is that the owners of
the stock naturally assume the value of the corporate assets to
be at least equal to the face value of the stock, demand an ade-
quate return for the same, and in the effort to secure such return
both demand excessive prices for services rendered, and unduly
impair and cheapen the service."'"
Similar views are expressed in the report of the commission
appointed by President Taft in 1910 "to investigate questions per-
taining to the issuance of stocks and bonds by railroad corpora-
tions. '3 2 The report of this commission, which was transmitted
to Congress by the President, with -his hearty concurxence -there-
in, under date of December 11, 1911, -after. recommending a fed-
eral statute ,encouraging the formation of railroad corpora-
tions with shares having no par value, and the reorganization of
such corporations on the same basis, continues as follows:
"All of these considerations seem to apply with equal force to
the securities of railroads under state incorporations, and we be-
lieve the law of the several states could with advantage be mod-
ified so as to provide for the issuance of stock without par
value." 33
Another limitation which appears to restrict unnecessarily the
application of the principle of unvalued stock is to be found in
the provisions incorporated in many of the acts prohibiting the
issuance without nominal value of stock "having a preference as
to principal" or, as expressed in other statutes, "stock preferred
as to its distributive share of the assets upon dissolution." A
few of the statutes go so far as to except from the operation
of the act stock preferred as to dividends or subject to redemp-
tion at a fixed price. It is submitted that no controlling reason
exists why preferred stock, whether it enjoys a preference as to
principal or dividends or as to both, should not be issued with-
out the annexation thereto of a par value. If the preference is
as to dividends, the certificate may fix the preferential amount in
money instead of on the basis of a percentage of the par value,
31Reports of New York State Bar Association, 1911, Vol. 34, 69-71.
32The personnel of this commission included Arthur T. Hadley,
Chairman, Frederick N. Judson, Frederick Strauss, Walter L. Fisher and
B. H. Meyer.
33 House Documents, Vol. 139, 62d Congress, 2nd Session, 1911-1912.
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as has heretofore been the practice, whereas, if the preference is
as to principal, the extent and amount thereof may be set out in
the body of the certificate without the necessity of imparting to
it a definite par value. Weight is lent to this argument by the
fact that even in those jurisdictions which prohibit the issuance,
without nominal value, of stock preferred as to principal, it is
conceded that no necessary relationship exists between the par
value of stock and the amount to which the shareholders are en-
titled upon the distribution of the surplus assets of the corpora-
tion. Thus, in a recent case construing the provisions of the
New York statute, which does not sanction the issuance, without
nominal value, of stock preferred as to principal, the court says:
"These provisions show that the par value of the stock is not
the precise amount which the holder may receive from the sur-
plus assets upon dissolution, but that the matter may be con-
trolled by the certificate of incorporation. 3 4
Despite the lack of uniformity in detail so far as the various
non par value acts are concerned, the vital principle which is
common to them all has been accepted in so many of our juris-
dictions and has commanded such distinguished support, that it
may be confidently anticipated that unvalued stock will, at no
distant date, be expressly sanctioned in the great majority if not
in all of the states. In the meantime, however, interesting and
difficult problems are being presented for solution in connection
with the attempted entrance of corporations having shares with-
out par value into commonwealths which have not as yet accorded
them recognition.
One of the questions so arising is whether express legisla-
tive sanction is a condition precedent to the organization of a
corporation having shares of stock without nominal value. As
has already been noted, in the majority of the states, either by
express statutory provisions or by necessary implication, par
value constitutes an essential feature of the accepted plan of cap-
italization. Even in those states whose statutes are wholly silent
so far as the nominal value of shares is concerned, no attempt
appears to have been made to organize corporations with un-
valued shares, although it might well be argued that, inasmuch
"as valued shares do not constitute one of the essential attributes
of a corporation, the incorporators should be permitted, in the
absence of some statutory inhibition, to provide for the issuance
34People ex rel. v. Hugo, Secretary of State, (1920) 191 App. Div.
628, 182 N. Y. S. 9.
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of shares without nominal value. While this question does not
as yet appear to have been presented to the courts for decision,
it is highly improbable that they will sanction such a wide de-
parture from the time-honored scheme of capitalization in the
absence of express legislative authority.
Another problem presents itself when a corporation organ-
ized with no par value shares seeks to do business as a foreign
corporation in a state where such organizations are not author-
ized. The question has recently come up for decision before the
courts of last resort of Kansas and Missouri.35 The Kansas
court was first to pass on it. A Delaware company sought by
mandamus to compel the state charter board to consider its ap-
plication to do business in Kansas. The case arose on original
proceedings before the supreme court and came to issue on the
demurrer of the attorney general. The court held that the com-
pany should be admitted to do business in Kansas.
36 The court
said in answer to the argument that the state would have great
difficulty in determining the amount of fees such a corporation
should pay:
"The problem of determining the solvency and bona fide
capitalization of the plaintiff presents no unusual difficulty. The
fact that the shares of its stock have no nominal par value is of
little consequence. Any prudent charter board, in determining
whether a foreign corporation is worthy of admission to do busi-
ness in Kansas, would attach little importance to the nominal
value of its shares of stock, even if they have a nominal value.
As in all other cases, the charter board should concern itself
earnestly to ascertain the genuine capital-those assets perma-
nently devoted to the corporate business as a fair basis for its
business credit and upon which its hope of profits is rationally
founded."
The M issouri case arose in much the same manner as the one
in Kansas. A Delaware corporation with 130,000 shares of stock
divided into 30,000 shares of preferred stock of a par value of
$100 a share, and 100,000 shares of common stock without par
value, sought to obtain a license to do business in Missouri as
a foreign corporation. The secretary of state having refused to
grant it permission, it proceeded against him by mandamus. The
35As previously noted, laws were passed by the 1921 Sessions of both
the Kansas and Missouri legislatures making provision for the organiza-
tion of corporations having shares without par value. The cases here
referred to were decided before these acts were passed.
3sNorth American Petroleum Co. v. State Charter Board, (1919) 105
Kan. 161, 181 Pac. 625.
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court ordered that a license should be granted.3 7 The argument
was again raised that such a corporation could not be taxed in a
manner provided by the laws of Missouri. This objection was
held to be untenable, the opinion citing with approval the lan-
guage of the Kansas court above quoted. The court found "noth-
ing inherently fraudulent or contra bonos mores in that species of
stock or in corporations organized with it," nor were the inter-
ests of the public affected adversely by it for
"in every case a person dealing with such a company could
ascertain the amount of actual assets before giving credit, as
readily as if the stock had a nominal value, for the value of as-
sets, not the par value of stock, is the essential fact."
In view of the growing importance of this question an effort
has been made by the writers to obtain an expression from 'the
secretaries of state, or other proper officials, in the various states
relating to their attitude toward the admission of such foreign
corporations to do business in their respective states. To these
inquiries a decided majority have given a favorable answer. 38 A
few have replied in the negative.39 It may well be doubted, in
view of the Kansas and Missouri decisions, whether the posi-
tion of the.latter would be sustained by the courts.
Among the states admitting such corporations there Is, how-
ever, no uniformity in the means employed in finding a basis for
computing the franchise fee. The question recently came up be-
fore the supreme court of Michigan.40 A corporation organized
under the laws of Delaware with no par value stock had qualified
to do business in Michigan. The question having arisen as to the
method that should be followed in computing the franchise
tax for this corporation in the latter state, the Michigan court
held that the no par stock of the corporation must for fran-
chise fee purposes be taken-to be of a par value of $100 a share.
37State ex rel. Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan, (1920) 282 Mo. 261,
221 S.W. 728.38The following states, which have not adopted the non par value
stock act, nevertheless admit foreign corporations having shares without
nominal value: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,l Texas, Utah and Vermont. In all states
which have adopted the non par value stock act foreign corporations
organized on this basis are admitted.
39The following states are refusing admission to such corporations:
Georgia, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wash-
ington.
40Detroit Mortgage Corporation v. Vaughan, (1920) 211 Mich. 320, 178
N. W. 697.
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In reaching this conclusion the court adopted the basis of valua-
tion placed on such shares (for computing the tax) by the laws
of the state where the corporation was domiciled.41
As distinguished from the Michigan view the Kansas court
held that the capital of a foreign corporation with shares of no
par value should be computed on the basis determined by the act
relating to foreign corporations in Kansas, namely, that the fee
should be based on that proportion of its lawfully issued capital
which the corporation proposed to invest and use in the exercise
of its corporate privileges within the state.42  This method of
valuation for taxing purposes was also sanctioned by the Mis-
souri court.43 In Illinois it is provided by statute that "if a for-
eign corporation has a capital stock of no par value, its shares for
the purpose of estimating the amount of fees and taxes to be paid
hereunder, shall be considered to be of the par value of one hun-
dred dollars per share.
44
While not prescribed by its proponents as a panacea for all
corporate ills connected with the issuance of stock, certain dis-
tinct advantages are claimed to accrue from the omission of the
dollar mark from certificates of stock. Perhaps the most force-
ful and convincing argument in favor of the innovation is that
it gives expression to a fundamental principle of the law of cor-
porations, namely, that a certificate of stock is not a promise
to pay to the holder thereof the amount expressed on its face
or a reasonable rate of interest thereon, nor is it even evidence
that such a sum or its equivalent has been received by the cor-
poration from the original holder; but that, on the contrary, it
is a mere participation certificate entitling the owner to share,
ratably with the other stockholders, in the net profits of the cor-
poration, if any, and in the event of its dissolution, to share
41The writers are informed that the same basis of valuation is followed
in Utah.
"An interesting question will arise when a state like Michigan comes to
tax no par value stock of a foreign corporation whose state of nativity
sets no value on such stock for franchise fee purposes." (1920) 19
Michigan Law Review, 96.42North American Petroleum Co. v. State Charter Board, (1919)
105 Kans. 161, 181 Pac. 625. Colorado has adopted a like basis. In
Florida such corporations must pay a maximum fee of $250. In Minne-
sota a minimum fee of $50 is exacted unless it be shown that the com-
pany has more than $50,000 of capital employed in the state.43State ex rel. Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan, (1920) 282 Mo. 261,
221 S. W. 728.
44General Corporation Act, (1919) Sec. 101. In Massachusetts a
similar statutory provision prevails. Acts of 1918, Chap. 235. Indiana
and Nevada, without statutes, we are advised, follow the same practice.
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similarly in the assets of the corporation remaining after the pay-
ment of its debts and any preferences to which the other share-
holders may be entitled. This fact has been too often overlooked
by the purchaser of corporate securities, and evidence is not
lacking that the impressive figures emblazoned on the certificate,
more frequently than any of the other allurements of those mas-
ter pieces of the engraver's art, have enticed the unwary to finan-
cial disaster.
The argument that a certificate of stock having a nominal
value does not speak the truth but is misleading and delusive, has
been employed by the advocates of unvalued stock from the very
inception of the movement. In the report of the committee of the
New York State Bar Association submitted to that body in 1892
and recommending an amendment to the corporation laws pro-
viding for the formation of a class of business stock corpora-
tions whose capital stock might be "issued as representing pro-
portional parts of the whole capital without any nominal or par
value" appears this statement:
"The effect of such amendment would be to provide for meas-
urement of the interest or shares of the members of such a cor-
poration by a statement of proportion, as in the case of the part
owners of a ship, and not by an arbitrary assignment of money
value, which is delusive in the case of every corporation whose
capital stock has a market value either more or less than its nom-
inal par value. . . .It would relieve any possibility of in-jury to the public from misleading representations as to the
money value of corporate stock, 
-
Mr. Edward M. Shepard, in the address before the New
Hampshire Bar Association above referred to, gave forceful ex-
pression to the same idea in the following language:
"Everything which tends to obscure the fact that the corpora-
tion in reality is a joint venture or partnership with nothing of
value except its assets and the ability and character of those who
run it, is an injury to truth and to the sound interests of legiti-
mate corporations. Either corporations and those who promote
them do or they do not influence the public by their capitaliza-
tions. If they do not the capitalizations are superfluous and ir-
relevant; if they do, then the capitalizations are deceitful. The
change we are considering would make impossible accusation of
such deceit. The burden would be upon the investor of ascer-
taining actual value; and the liability of misrepresentation of
actual value or facts bearing upon actual value would be precisely
the same with respect to corporate property as with respect to
45Proceedings of New York State Bar Association, January 1892, 138.
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other property. . . . The advantage of the change may be
summed up, therefore, in that one word which generally signifies
the nearest approach to a cure of public evils: Truthfulness."46
Reference has previously been made to an opinion delivered
in July, 1908, by the Public Service Commission of the State of
New York for the Second District. The commission, speaking
through its chairman, F. W. Stevens, thus commented upon the
deceptiveness of the par value fetish:
"If once the public mind could be brought to regard shares of
stock, not as property in themselves, but as evidence of a right
in property, we might hope to be rid of the deceptive notion that
the par value of a share of stock is the slightest evidence of its
real value, or is any evidence of the dividend returns to which
the owner is entitled.
4 7
The Report of the Railroad Securities Commission, to which
reference has previously been made, after setting its stamp of
approval upon the non par value stock principle in the follow-
ing language:
"We do not believe the retention of the hundred dollar mark,
or any other dollar mark, upon the face of the share of stock,
is of essential importance. We are ready to recommend that the
law should encourage the creation of companies whose shares have
no par value, and permit existing companies to change their stock
into shares without par value whenever their convenience re-
quires it."
continues as follows:
. . . the creation of shares without par value
has the cardinal merit of accuracy. It makes no claims that the
share thus issued is anything more than a participation certifi-
cate."4
For more than a decade the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws have had under consideration the formulation of a pro-
posed uniform incorporation law, and no less than seven tenta-
tive drafts of such an act have been prepared. In the draft of the
act submitted by the commissioners at the meeting of the Amer-
ican Bar Association in 1912, there was embodied a provision for
non par value stock, and the reasons given for the recommenda-
tion were as follows:
"The purpose of removing the par valuation from certificates
of shares of stock was to make the certificates show more clearly
46Publications of the Bar Association of New Hampshire, N. S. Vol.
2, 273-297; also published in (1906) 18 Green Bag 601 et seq.47Reports of New York State Bar Association, 1911, Vol. 34, 69-71.
48House Documents, Vol. 139, 62d Congress, 2d Session, 1911-1912.
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the real and basic value of a share, as representing a right of
proportionate ownership in the net earnings of the corporation
and in the unliquidated and unstable sums describable as the ex-
cess of assets over liabilities. The plausible hypothesis upon
which the plan is based is that the designation of a par value on
the face of the certificate tends to produce upon the mind of an
intending -investor the impression that the return upon his
investment as expressed in dividends should be an adequate per-
centage of the value of the stock, as shown on its face by the
par valuation."
A further argument in support of unvalued stock which has
not infrequently been advanced by its advocates is that it will
afford a possible remedy, or at least a means of relief, so far
as the evils of over-capitalization and stock watering are con-
cerned. An interesting illustration of the extreme view that par
value stock is solely responsible for over-capitalization is to be
found in the following excerpt from the Third Annual Message
of Governor Edward C. Stokes to the Legislature of the State
of New Jersey:
"The problems growing out of capitalization in business cor-
porations are predicated entirely upon the fixed par value of the
issues. Par value is the basis of discussion concerning this sub-ject. If the shares of the stock in certain classes of corporations
were issued without a value fixed by the dollar mark, the diffi-
culty would be eliminated. If a corporation should be organized,
not with a thousand shares of stock of a value of $100.00 per
share, but simply with the issue of one thousand shares of stock
without any determined par value, the question of over-capital-
ization could never arise. . . . Dividends could be declared
upon the shares, not in rate per cent, but in fixed amounts, and
the question of over-capitalization would be entirely eliminated
for all parties concerned-for the corporation that sells, for the
public that buys its products and for the holders of its stock.' 49
As has heretofore been noted, a Special Committee on Cor-
poration Law was named at the 1908 session of the New York
State Bar Association for the purpose of formulating an amend-
ment to the corporation laws authorizing the organization of
business corporations without requirement of money denomina-
tion for their shares of capital stock. The report of this com-
mittee, together with a draft of bill, was submitted to the asso-
ciation at its session in 1909. With reference to the "fixed money
valuation, which has led to the abuses of nominal as distinguished
from actual capitalization," the committee expressed itself as fol-
lows:
49New Jersey Legislative Documents, Vol. 1, 1907, pp. 39, 41.
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"The abolition of the money denomination of shares would,
we believe, deprive those who promote corporations of the ad-
vantages, real or seeming, of that exaggerated capitalization
which undoubtedly is possible under the existing laws of every
or nearly every American state, and, at the same time, would
compel investors to fix attention upon actual value, free of the
influence of what, as overwhelming experience shows, tends to
become nominal or symbolic valuation." 50
Though the spread of the no-par-value idea throughout the
various parts of the country has been rapid since the passage of
the initial law in New York in 1912, it must not be assumed that
there has been no opposition. So well known an authority on
corporations as Mr. William W. Cook has raised his voice in pro-
test. In a recent issue of the Michigan Law Review"' Mr. Cook
has said as follows:
"We come now to the most peculiar remedy of all, namely,
the issue of stock without any par -value whatsoever. This can
hardly be called a remedy. It is quite the reverse. It legalizes
instead of restricting large issues of stock for property. The the-
ory of this recent innovation is that the American public should
be educated up to the idea that a share of stock represents but
a proportion of the corporate property. The American public,
however, is incurably imbued with the idea that a share of stock
represents or should represent a fixed sum, instead of imagina-
tion or machinations of promoters. As a matter of fact, the pub-
lic generally has no definite idea of the value of property turned
in for stock, and hence if unlimited stock may be issued for
all kinds of property the danger of fraud is greatly increased.
Unreliable men may issue stock without par value to an amount,
limited only by their capacity to induce the public to buy it.
It is of course safer for promoters to issue stock without par
value for choice assortments of property, but how the investor
and the public benefit has not yet appeared. Stock without par
value adds to the mystery as to what the stock really represents,
and the public still compares the market price of such stock with
$100 par, without regard to whether or not the stock is without
par value."52
Later in the same article Mr. Cook continues:
"On the whole stock without par value looks like a skillfully
devised scheme for issuing a maximum of watered stock at a
minimum risk. In the hands of reliable men it may be all
right, but not needed; in the hands of unreliable men it is all
wrong. It conceals the mystery of 'water.' Investors
5OReports of New York State Bar Association, 1909, Vol. 32, 270-280.
5'"Watered Stock- Commissions - Blue Sky Laws - Stock Without
Par Value," (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 583.
52d., 591, 592, 593.
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will grow wary of stock which dares not state on its face how
much money or property it represents. The old law, even with
its feeble liabilities, had some restraining influence on the cupid-
ity of promoters; this law has none. While investors do not
object to liberal profits to promoters, yet they object to unfair
profits in the way of too many shares to pay reasonable dividends.
Investors do not know, and have no means of knowing what a
promoter pays for the property he capitalizes. Shares without
par value conceal -what money or property a share really repre-
sents."5
3  
.
Since that portion of the public that is interested in the af-
fairs of a corporation is made up of investors and creditors, the
fraud Mr. Cook refers to must be visited on either or both of
these. Taking up first then the case of the creditor who deals,
or has dealt, with a corporation which has issued shares without
par value.
The creditor is above all a business man, and as such we
must endow him with business sense. To assume that this man
of experience will lend his money or transfer his property un-
der the spell of the dollar sign on a share of stock is to build
one's case on pure fiction and to close one's eyes to facts. Mr.
Machen has well said:
"Corporations do not in fact get credit on any such theory;
and money lenders have proved themselves to be much too hard-
headed to act on any such legal fiction. Corporations get credit
either on the actual value of their assets, or on the integrity and
standing of their officers and managers, and not at all on the nom-
inal value of stock. 54
Furthermoi-e, were it possible to have the nominal capital of
a corporation originally to equal the actual value of its assets, yet,
as previously observed, this can at best be only temporary. The
nominal capital of a going concern cannot long equal the cor-
porate assets whether the corporation is in normal or abnormal
operation. Even more does this constant fluctuation in the
value of the assets make par value an impossible guide to cred-
itors. The fact is that the creditor is not misled by this fiction
of par value; he seeks out the assets. And this he can do with
equal facility when the fiction is abolished.
But how about the case of the investor? The fear is that
the removal of the dollar sign from the shares will make it yet
more easy to mislead the gullible public. It is not contended that
5Id., 595.
54Report of the Committee on a Uniform Incorporation Act (1920) 6.
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no-par-value is a cure for all the evils incident to the promotion
of corporations. 5 But it is claimed that it is truthful, and that
fewer opportunities exist, when properly supervised and regu-
lated, to defraud the investor. Further, "the substitution for
shares with a par value, of shares without nominal valuation,
would put the investor on guard, and would dispel misunder-
standing on the part of the public." '56
In commenting on the New York law authorizing the creat-
ing of corporations with shares having no par value, Mr. Mora-
wetz has said:
"A corporation formed under this statute must state in its
certificate of incorporation the amount of capital with which it
will carry on business, and it is prohibited from engaging in
business or incurring debts until the stated amount of capital shall
have been received by the corporation in money or in property
at its actual value. However, the shares issued by the corpora-
tion would have no nominal or par value, and the corporation
should be permitted to issue and sell them at their actual or mar-
ket value.
"The policy of the New York Statute is sound. It recog-
nizes that shares in a corporation represent only aliquot interests
in its capital, whatever that may be, and that their nominal or
par value is no indication of their actual value or of the actual
capital of the corporation. It requires the amount of actual cap-
ital of a corporation formed under the law to be stated in the
certificate of incorporation, and imposes a severe penalty upon
the directors in case of the creation of indebtedness before re-
ceiving the prescribed capital. Thus it furnishes to creditors
and the public generally a measure of protection greater than
that furnished by the generally prevailing incorporation laws. At
the same time it is in furtherance of sound business methods by
enabling corporations to raise money by selling shares at their
actual value instead of by borrowing or otherwise increasing
their indebtedness.2
5 7
For further precautions it might be well to provide:
"That officers of corporations be required to draw up esti-
mates of their resources, plans for future operations, etc., and
publish them to the stockholders at frequent intervals."5 "
Mr. Machen in his tentative draft of an act to make uniform
the law of business corporations has inserted as a protection to
the public the following provision:
55Ignatius, Financing of Public Service Corporations (1918) 78-83.56Shares Without Par Value, (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 278.
57Shares Without Nominal or Par Value, (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 729,
730, 731.
58Shares Without Par Value, (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 278, 281.
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"Any share of stock having no par value may be issued sub-
ject to the payment of any sum of money, or in exchange for
any property or rights which the corporation is authorized to
acquire or hold, or for services rendered to, or inuring to the
benefit of the corporation, provided a certificate setting forth
the number of shares in question, and the amount to be paid
thereon, and describing with reasonable definiteness the property
or rights or services to be accepted in payment thereof shall
have been, prior to the issue thereof, executed, acknowledged and
recorded as amendments to the Articles of Incorporation are re-
quired to be executed, acknowledged and recorded. Shares of
stock having no par value shall not be issued until such a certifi-
cate shall have been executed, acknowledged and recorded and
then only pursuant to the terms of such certificate. Such cer-
tificate may as to any shares which have not been actually issued
pursuant thereto be amended by a new certificate executed, ac-
knowledged and recorded in like manner as the original cer-
tificate." 59
The further objection raised by Mr. Cook that the American
public is incurably imbued with the idea that a share of stock
represents, or should represent, a fixed sum finds an answer in
the fact that the "stocks of corporations organized under these
statutes are quoted on the exchange side by side with those with
a par value and are dealt in without seeming discrimination. The
number of corporations taking advantage of this statute is in-
creasing, as confidence in the benefits of the change is estab-
lished." 0
Every fair-minded advocate of the theory of unvalued stock
will welcome discussion and criticism of the principle, for the
fact must be recognized that legislation embodying such a rad-
ical innovation and extending over a period of only ten years
cannot be wholly adequate or free from imperfections. More-
over, the unscrupulous promoter will as certainly seek to serve
his own selfish ends through the manipulation of unvalued shares
as he has through the use of valued shares in the past, and the
necessity of further safeguards will doubtless develop with the
increasing use of non par value stock. However, the fact re-
mains that it is a condition rather than a theory with which
we are confronted and that the question is no longer one for
academic discussion. The spread of the movement continues un-
abated, and the fact that foreign corporations with shares of no
59Report of the Committee on a Uniform Incorporation Act (1920) 16.
6oShares Without Par Value, (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 278, 280.
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par value are being freely admitted into all but a few of the
states will unquestionably hasten the adoption of the act in the
jurisdictions where the formation of domestic corporations on
this basis is not now permissible. Otherwise, foreign corpora-
tions will possess an advantage denied to domestic corporations.
This proved to be one of the most forceful and convincing argu-
ments in favor of the passage of the non par value stock act by
the 1921 legislatures of Kansas and Missouri, into which states,
as has previously been noted, foreign corporations having unval-
ued shares had previously forced their entrance through proceed-
ings in mandamus.
It is submitted, therefore, that the theory, having received
such widespread legislative sanction, is now entitled to a fair
trial in actual practice, and that the most valuable criticism at
the present time will be constructive rather than destructive. If,
after such trial, it shall develop, as Mr. Cook suggests, that
stock without par value is merely "a skillfully devised scheme for
issuing a maximum of watered stock at a minimum risk," it
must fail, and its failure would mark the passing of a movement
remarkable both for the distinguished and disinterested charac-
ter of its proponents and the rapidity of its spread.
